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THOUGHTS ON THE U.N. 2017 POPULATION 
PROSPECTS: PROCREATION-RELATED 
INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS, AND 
OVERPOPULATION AS GLOBAL RISK 
Ciprian N. Radavoi*  
ABSTRACT 
Two relatively recent factual elements are the basis of this Article: 
the 2017 revision of the United Nations’ Population Prospects, 
showing a world population increase of around 50% by 2100, and 
Turkey’s President Erdogan’s call for the Turks living in Western 
Europe to “have five children” in order to become the future of the 
continent. The statement substantiates one of the negative impacts 
of overpopulation—that on international relations and regional 
balances of power.  This Article argues that (1) Erdogan’s 
incitement to increased procreation abroad qualifies as an 
internationally wrongful act of Turkey; (2) excessive procreation 
within national boundaries could qualify as an internationally 
wrongful act; and (3) although without legal consequences on the 
perpetrating countries, such a qualification has at least the potential 
of igniting a renewed debate on the issue of overpopulation.  In this 
context, one way forward as a matter of global policy on the now-
stalled debate on population is suggested. 
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INTRODUCTION 
           The 2017 revision of the United Nations’ (“U.N.”) ‘World 
Population Prospects’1 insists on the dramatic differences in fertility 
among countries and regions of the world, thus inviting further 
consideration of those gaps’ global impact.  Built around the 
medium growth scenario, the study makes it clear that: 
 
To achieve the substantial reductions 
in fertility projected in the medium 
variant, it will be essential to support 
continued improvements in access to 
reproductive health care services, 
including family planning, especially 
in the least developed countries, with 
a focus on enabling women and 
couples to achieve their desired 
family size.2  
 
With the U.N.’s study as background, this Article takes as a 
departure point one particular aspect of the fertility gap between 
nations and cultures: purposeful multiplication of an ethnic group in 
order to alter the demographic balance in a region at the instigation 
of state leaders.  More specifically, the starting point of this Article 
is the call made in March of 2017 by the President of Turkey to the 
Turkish families living in Europe: “Have not just three but five 
children. . . . The place in which you are living and working is now 
your homeland and new motherland.  Stake a claim to it.”3  
           At first sight, the right theoretical framework for analysing 
the presidential statement is the stakeholder theory, which, in one of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 U.N. Dep’t of Int’l Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Population Div., World 
Population Prospects: 2017 Revision, Key Findings and Advance Tables, U.N. 
Doc. ESA/P/WP/248 (2017) [hereinafter World Population Prospects]. 
2 Id. at 6.  
3 Raf Sanchez, Erdogan Calls on Turkish Families in Europe to Have 
Five Children to Protect Against ‘Injustices’, THE TELEGRAPH (Mar. 17, 2017, 
6:34 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/17/erdogan-calls-turkish-
families-have-five-children-bulwark-against/. 
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its most widely employed versions,4 posits that stakeholders5 
influence an organization to varying degrees, depending on their 
power, legitimacy, and urgency.  The organization in this case is the 
U.N., given their Population Division role in the governmental 
dialogue on population and development, and more generally given 
their role in preserving world peace.  As stakeholders, there are the 
states that rely on large populations to give them leverage in the 
international relations, transnational corporations (“TNCs”) who 
need constantly-growing markets, and major religions where priests 
need large congregations.  On the other side of the balance are 
stakeholders like the individuals, women especially, who naturally 
aim for reduced family sizes, as suggested by the U.N. in the above 
block quote.  On the same side are also the future generations, who 
may ‘claim’ the right to live on a non-crowded planet, and even the 
natural world, increasingly aggressed by the spread of the human 
race.  Synthesizing the irreconcilable and often short-sighted 
positions of the numerous stakeholders, one author purports:   
 
Poor nations with exploding 
populations charge racism, 
colonialism, imperialism, and 
demand aid, but do not deal with their 
overpopulation, deteriorating 
environment, and corruption.  
Feminists might ascribe blame to 
patriarchy, racism, and lack of rights 
for women.  Human rights advocates 
might uphold the principle that each 
woman should have the right to 
determine how many children she 
bears.  Most religions prefer to see 
human population increase, basing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Ronald K. Mitchell, Bradley R. Agle & Donna J. Wood, Toward a 
Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience: Defining the Principle of Who 
and What Really Counts, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 853 (1997). 
5 In the foundational work of the stakeholder theory, a stakeholder is 
defined as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organization’s objectives.” EDWARD R. FREEMAN, STRATEGIC 
MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 46 (Pitman Pub.) (1984). 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss1/3
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this view on ancient teachings created 
for another time and very different 
circumstances.  Each one of these 
groups tries to define the world 
through their own specific special 
interest, losing the overall 
perspective.6   
 In this view, the stakeholder theory would lead nowhere, 
because all of the above-mentioned stakeholders claim legitimacy 
and urgency.  As for power, it is rather on the side of the 
stakeholders who favor the status quo: major churches and the 
transnational corporations.  This Article proposes instead a 
discussion confined to international law, that is, to norms on 
sovereignty, non-interference, cooperation and peace, and human 
rights.  
 
T he remainder of the Article is built on two pillars.  The first 
one is a doctrinal discussion based on rules of public international 
law, aiming to show that state actions (like in the case of the above 
statement of Turkey) or omissions to act (the case of states that do 
not tackle excessive population growth) are internationally wrongful 
acts in the actual circumstances of globalization and border 
permeability.  The second pillar moves toward global public policy, 
showing that the findings in the first section, while not triggering 
legal consequences, can at least contribute to a revival of the 
population debate.  In this context, this Article points to the nodes 
in the population debate, indicates the recent developments that may 
shake the actual spiral of silence on population, and suggests one 
way forward. 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Anthony J. Cassils, Overpopulation, Sustainable Development, and 
Security: Developing an Integrated Strategy, 25 POPULATION & ENV’T 171, 172 
(2004).  
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I.   PART I – EXCESSIVE FERTILITY RATES AS 
INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS 
(a)   Incitement to Overbreeding Abroad as Breach of International 
Norms 
Erdogan’s call to increased procreation by Turkish families 
residing in Europe, with the specific purpose to become “the future 
of Europe,”7 has all of the elements for being seen as an 
internationally wrongful act of Turkey (in addition to a breach of 
women’s right to dignity, since in the presidential vision, they seem 
to appear as mere children-producing tools).  In the well-known 
formulation of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles 
on State Responsibility, “[t]here is an internationally wrongful act 
of a State when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) is 
attributable to the State under international law; and (b) constitutes 
a breach of an international obligation of the State.”8  Since the 
statement was made by the President, attribution is not a contentious 
matter here; the troika head of state - head of government - minister 
of foreign affairs is seen as representing the State of Turkey without 
further demonstration.  As for the obligations that are breached, they 
are sourced in the U.N. Charter and customary law, as detailed 
below. 
 
           Turkey’s incitement is anything but friendly, and as such, is 
against the principle of good neighbourliness stipulated in the U.N. 
Charter’s preamble and its Article 1(2).9  Moreover, Article 2(4) 
prohibits “the threat or use of force against the . . . political 
independence of any state.”10  It is now agreed that prohibited 
intervention in another state’s affairs does not refer exclusively to 
military intervention, as such a limited interpretation “ignores the 
modern techniques ranging from subversion to hostile propaganda 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Russell Goldman, ‘You are the Future of Europe,’ Erdogan Tells Turks, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2017, at A5.  
8 Int’l Law Comm’n Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. 
Doc. A/56/10, art. 2 (2001). 
9 U.N. Charter pmbl., art. 1(2). 
10 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶5. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss1/3
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that are used to undermine the internal autonomy of another State.”11  
In Nicaragua v. United States of America (“Nicaragua”), the Court 
stated that intervention is prohibited either “directly or indirectly, 
with or without armed force.” 12  
 
 If not as an ‘intervention,’ Turkey’s action qualifies at least 
as an ‘interference,’ and the Security Council made it clear that all 
states should refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of 
others.13  The broader view on what qualifies as a prohibited 
intervention or interference is confirmed in the Friendly Relations 
Declaration, and recognized as an expression of customary law in 
Nicaragua, which held that armed intervention and “any other form 
of interference” with a state’s political, economic and cultural 
elements are condemned.14  The Princeton Encyclopedia of Self-
Determination specifically includes alteration of the democratic 
political process in another country in the list of prohibited 
intrusions.15  In light of all these aspects, purposefully increasing an 
ethnic group’s proportion abroad is subversive, interferes with host 
states’ political and cultural affairs, and is thus prohibited by binding 
international norms.  With the subversive intention being clearly 
incorporated in President Erdogan’s political statement, a 
hypothetical tribunal, even applying the strictest standard of proof 
(i.e., beyond reasonable doubt), would probably agree that Turkey’s 
purpose was to establish in time a democratic domination of the 
Turkish (now) minorities in their host countries by the power of 
numbers and votes, or at least to alter the cultural fabric in those 
countries.  In the second scenario, tension and conflict would come 
as a natural consequence, undermining political stability.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Richard A. Falk, The United States and the Doctrine of 
Nonintervention in the Internal Affairs of Independent States, 5 HOW. L.J. 163, 
166 (1959).	  
12 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. 
v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 206 (June 27). 
13 S.C. Res. 1234, ¶ 1 (Apr. 9, 1999). 
14 See G.A. Res. 25/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970); Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at ¶ 
55 (emphasis added). 
15 Michael Wood, Non-Intervention (Non-intervention in domestic 
affairs), THE PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SELF-DETERMINATION, 
http://pesd.princeton.edu/?q=node/258 (last visited Sep. 13, 2017).   
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(b)   Overpopulation at National Level as Breach of International 
Norms 
           The above discussion on outright interference by altering the 
ethnic balance in a foreign country prompts an analysis of the more 
general case of a country flooding another one with people.  This 
analysis was made, with no conclusive result, for the particular case 
of countries that provoke the flow of a large number of refugees.16  
The argument for holding the home country responsible was that, by 
pushing its citizens out of its territory, the government is aware that 
the victims, qualifying as refugees, have to be accepted, kept, and 
looked after by states party to the 1951 Geneva Convention on 
Refugees, given its non-refoulment principle.17  As such, the home 
country affects the sovereign rights of its neighbours to decide 
whom they admit to their territories.18  When refugees flee in large 
numbers, problems beyond this breach of sovereignty arise: pressure 
on the economy of the host country, potentially affecting the locals’ 
own well-being, and tensions due to regional cultural imbalances in 
areas hosting most refugees.19  
            
However, these are mostly theoretical considerations; they 
have not yet taken the shape of global public policy, as the 
perpetrating state is usually in no condition to make good for its 
wrongs at the moment of the crimes, being, for example, thorn by 
civil war like Syria currently.  As for demanding compensation at a 
later moment in time, such a demand would create the awkward 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See, e.g., Nafees Ahmad, Refugees: State Responsibility, the Country 
of Origin and Human Rights, 10 ASIA PAC. J. HUM. RTS. & L. 1 (2009). 
17 Id. at 15. 
18 See Luke T. Lee, The Right to Compensation: Refugees and Countries 
of Asylum, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 532 (1986); see also Luke T. Lee, The Cairo 
Declaration of Principles of International Law on Compensation to Refugees, 
April 1992, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 157 (1993) (showing that turning a person into a 
refugee is an internationally wrongful act and the United Nations High 
Commissariat for Refugees (“UNHCR”) can claim compensation from the home 
country). 
19 See Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, 
Standing Committee, Social and Economic Impact of Large Refugee Populations 
on Host Developing Countries, ¶¶ 2-14, U.N. Doc. EC/47/SC/CRP.7 (Jan. 6, 
1997). 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss1/3
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situation that the refugees, now back in their homeland, are debtors 
and creditors simultaneously.20  That is, they would be owed money 
from the public budget, as compensation for their suffering, but they 
would be also contributors to that payment, as tax payers.21  
Accordingly, cases are rare when the state-sources of massive 
refugee flows are accepted, or were forced to accept, responsibility 
toward the states hosting its people.   Examples of these cases would 
include Germany after World War II and Iraq, as the result of the 
United Nation Security Council (“UNSC”) Resolution after the 
invasion of Kuwait.22 
          
The situation discussed in this paper is similar with regard to 
the effects on receiving countries.  Dramatic differences in fertility 
among countries make huge migration flows inevitable, by a 
mechanism that may be seen to metaphorically mirror the principle 
of communicating vessels from the physics of fluids.23  The 
economic, social, and security impacts referred to above are the 
same.  In this case, however, it is not the action of the migrant 
sending countries that causes migration, but rather, their inaction: 
failure to tackle overpopulation.   People flee from poverty, not from 
discrimination and abuse.  A discussion on a home state’s 
responsibility for failing to achieve a population density optimal for 
life, and consequently flooding other countries with mass 
emigration, has not yet taken place.   However, the most recent U.N. 
revision of the population prospects, emphasizing dramatic 
differences in fertility between regions of the world,24 suggests that 
such a discussion is timely. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See Ahmad, supra note 16, at 13.  
21 Id.  
22 Christian Tomuschat, State Responsibility and the Country of Origin, 
in THE PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES IN THE LIGHT OF CONTEMPORARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES 59, 66 (Vera Gowlland-Debbas ed., 1996); see U.N. 
Comp. Comm’n, Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure, art. 5, U.N. Doc. 
S/AC.26/1992/INF.1. (Jun. 26, 1992).   
23 Ferdinand J. C. M. Rath, Population Problems: A Constituent of 
General Culture in the 21st Century, 39 INT’L REV. EDUC. 5, 9 (1992). 
24 World Population Prospects, supra note 1, at 6. 
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The discussion should begin with the concept of 
overpopulation (“OP”), which, according to the Merriam-Webster 
dictionary, is “the condition of having a population so dense as to 
cause environmental deterioration, an impaired quality of life, or a 
population crash.”25  There seems to be agreement among scholars 
that OP is undesirable: it brings poverty26 and  democratic deficits,27 
lays at the origin of environmental destruction,28 and leads to 
conflicts over resources.29  More relevantly for this Article’s focus, 
OP exports tension and conflict via mass migration and the 
subsequent impossibility or unwillingness of integration of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Overpopulation, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/overpopulation (last visited Nov. 
19, 2017). 
26 See, e.g., Robert Eastwood, The Impact of Changes in Human Fertility 
on Poverty, 36 J. DEV. STUD. 1 (1999) (finding a positive correlation between 
population growth and absolute poverty); see also Martha Campbell, Return of 
the Population Factor: Its Impact upon the Millennium	  Development Goals, 315 
AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI. 1501, 1501 (2007) (report of hearings 
by the group showing that the rapid	  pace of population growth in Africa and some 
other areas makes eradication of poverty impossible.).	  
27 See, e.g., Albert A. Bartlett, Democracy Cannot Survive 
Overpopulation, 22 POPULATION & ENV’T 63 (2000) (describing democracy loss 
as the dilution of voice due to addition of people in the same administrative unit); 
see also Carol J. Greenhouse, Democracy and Demography, 2 IND. J GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 21 (1994) (describes yet a different type of democracy loss, i.e., 
rendering voiceless local populations overwhelmed by mass immigration in the 
U.S. and the E.U.). 
28 Lester Brown, creator of World Watch Institute, said: “We can see the 
loss of tree cover, the devastation of grasslands, the soil erosion, the crowding and 
poverty, the land hunger, and the air and water pollution associated with [the] 
addition of people.” TYLER G. MILLER JR., LIVING IN THE ENVIRONMENT: 
PRINCIPLES, CONNECTIONS, AND SOLUTIONS 47 (10th ed. 1996); see also Union 
of Concerned Scientists, World Scientists’ Warning to Humanity, 18 POPULATION 
& DEV. REV. 782, 782-83 (1992). 
29 See, e.g., RICHARD P. CINCOTTA et al., THE SECURITY DEMOGRAPHIC: 
POPULATION AND CIVIL CONFLICT AFTER THE COLD WAR (2003) (showing that 
the chance of civil conflict is positively correlated with the proportion of young 
adults, fighting for jobs and leadership, in the adult population); see also James 
A. Brander, Sustainability: Malthus Revisited?, 40 CAN. J. ECON. 1 (2007) 
(indicating overpopulation as the main cause in recent conflicts in Central Asian 
or African countries). 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss1/3
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ethnically or religiously diverse migrant populations,30 or simply as 
a result of terrorism being nurtured in overpopulated poor 
countries.31 
 
 It would appear that similar to the case of refugees, the issue 
of state responsibility for highly exaggerated fertility rates could be 
raised.  A counter-argument is that, unlike in the case of refugees, 
overpopulated states do not have their hands tied by the non-
refoulment principle and thus can simply keep their borders closed.  
Such reasoning, however, does not stand in actual circumstances, as 
can be seen by the tens of thousands arriving yearly in Italy and 
Greece after crossing the Mediterranean Sea on boats, and the 
millions more to come.32  The problem with the causality link 
between the potentially wrongful act of the home country 
(overpopulation) and the damage to the host country (economic, 
social, security, etc.) does not lay in the willing acceptance of 
immigrants by the host, but in conceptual and factual uncertainties 
related to the idea of overpopulation.  
 
As mentioned above, there is wide agreement that OP is bad, 
but beyond this, there is a field of total contradiction as to when in 
fact a country experiences OP, and as to whether any action against 
OP is legally and morally permissible.  If a country can do nothing 
to tackle OP within its borders, then, taking into account that it is 
also barred from forcibly keeping its people inside, its responsibility 
toward other countries or toward the international society as a whole 
cannot be established.  These matters are the object of the next 
section, conceived as a brief literature review underlying areas of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 See, e.g., Rath, supra note 23 (showing that international overflows of 
population can lead to fear of losing identity among host populations, and from 
here, to xenophobia); see also Jack A. Goldstone, Population and Security: How 
Demographic Change Can Lead to Violent Conflict, 56 J INT’L AFF. 4, 13-14 
(2002) (explaining clashes between locals and immigrants on economic 
resources and cultural identity). 
31 Cassils, supra note 6, at 187. 
32 Justin Huggler, Up to 6.6m Migrants Waiting to Cross to Europe from 
Africa: Report, THE TELEGRAPH (May 23, 2017, 5:53), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/23/66m-migrants-waiting-cross-
europe-africa-report/; see also Mediterranean Situation, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR 
REFUGEES, http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean. 
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disagreement and pointing to some recent evolutions in the for-now-
stalled debate on overpopulation. 
II.   PART II – A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY FOR GLOBAL 
POLICY ON OVERPOPULATION? 
(a)   Main Nodes of the Debate on Overpopulation 
           The first area of academic disagreement regards the present 
and concerns the threshold over which we should speak about OP. 
It has been shown that humans have always had a somewhat 
irrational fear of not becoming too many.33  Accordingly, numerous 
authors ridicule those who today raise the spectre of OP in a 
panicked manner.34  These authors argue that there is no such thing 
as OP,  it is just the land not being judiciously used, with huge areas 
left uninhabited while people rush to the big cities.35  Other authors 
point to overconsumption (“OC”), and not overpopulation, as the 
problem, if sustainability is seen in a global perspective. It was 
argued, for example, that with one child in the United Kingdom 
using as many resources as twenty-two in Malawi,36 scholars and 
academics in the Global North have no moral right to raise the issue 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 See Bart K. Holland, A View of Population Growth Circa AD 200, 19 
POPULATION & DEV. REV. 328 (1993) (see Tertullian warning some eighteen 
centuries ago that populations had grown to the extent that they are becoming 
burdensome to Earth). 
34 See Michael Balter, The Baby Deficit, 312 SCIENCE 1894 (2006) 
(stating that the population bomb “wasn’t” and the real issue is, on the contrary, 
the danger of under-population); Kai Nielsen, Global Justice, Capitalism and the 
Third World, 1 J. APPLIED PHIL. 175 (1984) (arguing that “[t]he principle problem 
is not overpopulation . . . but man-made problems”); Amartya Sen, Fertility and 
Coercion, 63 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 1035, 1044 (1996) (showing among other 
arguments that we should leave the population matter to “the responsible 
reflection of people themselves”). But see Brander, supra note 29, at 6 (noting 
that most academics writing about population live in areas with low fertility, 
which bars them from seeing the issue in a global perspective).  
35 This argument is centuries old: Engels believed that “it is absurd to 
talk of over-population so long as there is enough waste land of Mississippi for 
the whole population to be transplanted there.” See Friedrich Engels, Outline of a 
Critique of Political Economy, in 3 MARX AND ENGELS: COLLECTED WORKS 418, 
440 (Lawrence & Wishart, 2010). 
36 Blake Alcott, Population Matters in Ecological Economics, 80 
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 109, 114 (2012). 
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of OP in developing countries: not while their own countries 
continue to put pressure on global ecosystems.37 
 
           From the other side of the population debate, it is argued that 
OP does not mean a condition so bad as to lead to physical 
extinction, but just so bad as to affect the general quality of life.38  
In the word of one author: 
 
[T]here are relevant costs [of OP] 
short of human starvation: poverty, 
crime, lack of health care, hunger, 
global warming, overfishing, sprawl, 
ground-level ozone pollution, traffic 
jams, endangered species, the spread 
of infectious disease, overcrowding in 
schools, the unavailability of clean 
drinking water, destruction of 
wetlands, holes in the ozone layer, 
and shortages of oil.39   
 
Moreover, the argument of geographical redistribution does not 
stand today, because all areas with carrying capacity are already 
inhabited.40  As for the ‘OC versus OP’ discussion, it should rather 
be treated as the ‘OC and OP’ problem: overconsumption in the 
Global North and overpopulation in some areas of the Global South 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 See, e.g., George Monbiot, Stop Blaming the Poor: It’s the Wally-
yachters Who Are Burning the Planet, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 28, 2009), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cif-green/2009/sep/28/population-
growth-super-rich.  
38 See, e.g., Martin P. Golding MP & Naomi H. Golding, Ethical and 
Value Issues in Population Limitation and Distribution in the United States, 24 
VAND. L. REV. 495, 498 (1970) (“What is at stake is not the survival of the species, 
but rather the survival, or realization, of a way of life.”); see generally Jesper 
Ryberg, The Argument from Overpopulation: Logical and Ethical 
Considerations, 19 POPULATION & ENV’T 411 (1998) (discussing optimal 
populations). 
39 Sarah Conly, The Right to Procreation: Merits and Limits, 42 AM. 
PHIL. Q. 105, 111 (2005). 
40 Population-Environment Balance, Inc., Why Excess Immigration 
Damages the Environment, 13 POPULATION & ENV’T 303, 304 (1992). 
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equally affect sustainability.  Reducing consumption is only 
possible to some extent, and it is also likely that hundreds of millions 
in the developing world, when reaching the middle-class level, will 
naturally aim for consumption levels now common by the Western 
world’s middle class.41  In the end, therefore, numbers do matter, 
and tackling OC alone cannot resolve the problems.  As a famous 
agronomist warned upon receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize half a 
century ago: “If fully implemented, the [green] revolution can 
provide sufficient food for sustenance during the next three decades.  
But the frightening power of human reproduction must also be 
curbed; otherwise the success of the green revolution will be 
ephemeral only.”42 
 
 The second area of disagreement pertains to the future and 
concerns the uncertainty as to whether OP is even likely.  Those 
betting on a lower growth scenario rely on the well-known 
‘demographic transition theory’ (“DTT”), which posits that with 
economic development come lower fertility rates due to the action 
of various mechanisms, such as lower economic incentives for 
procreation, higher ages at which the first child is conceived, better 
education, and gender equality.43  But, on the other hand, the DTT 
has been challenged in recent decades with various arguments.44 
Moreover, the DTT-skeptics believe that “[t]o hold out hope in the 
theory of ‘demographic transition,’ where population growth stops 
only when per capita income and consumption reaches a respectable 
level, is to court disaster (imagine China [1.3 billion] or India [1.25 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Id. at 303 (noting that “every person, however conservative, adds to 
the environmental burden”). 
42 Norman Borlaug, Nobel Lecture—The Green Revolution, Peace, and 
Humanity, THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE (Dec. 11, 1970) (transcript on file with Nobel 
Media). 
43 See generally ROBERT WOODS, THE DEMOGRAPHY OF VICTORIAN 
ENGLAND AND WALES 18-19 (2000). 
44 See, e.g., Cassils, supra note 6 (showing that in Europe, demographic 
decline was achieved not in times of prosperity, but in the harsh economic years 
in the 1920s and 1930s); Andrey Korotayev & Julia Zinkina, East Africa in the 
Malthusian Trap?, 31 J. DEVELOPING SOC’YS. 385 (2015) (showing that in order 
for the DTT to work, countries need first to lower their fertility rates under a 
certain level). 
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billion] where nearly every family owns a car, a refrigerator, an air 
conditioner).”45 
 
Some of the optimists also believe that with population 
increasing, so does the necessity to innovate.46  Also on the side of 
the optimists is the common sense argument that higher population 
increases the pool of potential geniuses of tomorrow, who in turn 
will find the technological solutions for accommodating more 
people on Earth (e.g., better agricultural efficiency or improved 
urbanism).  The pessimists, however, counter-argue that high 
population growth rates dissipate the surplus that might otherwise 
support investment in research and development, bringing as 
argument the evidence that in recent decades, the most technological 
progress has originated in regions with the slowest growing 
populations.47  
 
Finally, a third issue that has stirred fevered debates is 
whether states are legally allowed to do anything about OP, even if 
we agree that OP is present or highly likely.  The discussion here 
concerns the balance of rights.  Is there an overriding public interest 
justifying limitations of reproductive rights?48  Are reproductive 
rights susceptible to limitations in the first place?49  Those who 
answer “no” sometimes rely on the sanctity of these rights—as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Robert Chapman, No Room at the Inn, or Why Population Problems 
Are Not All Economic, 21 POPULATION & ENVT’L L.J. 81, 86 (1999). 
46 See generally ESTER BOSERUP, POPULATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
CHANGE: A STUDY OF LONG-TERM TRENDS (1981) (claiming a positive 
correlation between population growth and technological creativity, explained by, 
inter alia, the fact that the former leads to scarcity, which in turn induces 
communities to find new solutions to deal with diminishing natural resources). 
47 Brander, supra note 29, at 20.  
48 See, e.g., Carter J. Dillard, Rethinking the Procreative Right, 10 YALE 
HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 3 (2007) (asking whether procreation is “in all 
circumstances just . . . without being subject to law and regard for others”). 
49 See Alcott, supra note, at 36, for a discussion on derogability (or lack 
thereof) from the reproductive rights. See JA Robinson, Provisional Thoughts on 
Limitations to the Right to Procreate, 18 POTCHEFSTROOM ELEC. L. J. (2015), for 
a legal analysis of the issue in the South African context.  
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freedoms touching upon the most intimate aspects of our lives.50 
Cultural rights are at stake, as well, since some cultures traditionally 
value large families.51  
 
On the contrary, those who believe that reproductive rights 
can be limited find ammunition in the very definition of the 
reproductive rights, constantly referred to, in all of the international 
instruments of the last half a century, as the right of couples to 
decide ‘freely and responsibly’ the number of their children.52  
‘Responsibly’ means considering the others’ right to not live in an 
overcrowded world, and to this end, a cap of two or three children 
per family is acceptable, since the right to parenthood was already 
fulfilled with the first child.53  Those who claim the couple’s 
inalienable right to choose how much to procreate54 are also pointed 
at as hypocritical since the term ‘couple’ in most of the areas where 
overpopulation is a problem means, in fact, ‘the male,’ as husband, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Alcott, supra note 36, at 115 (“[D]irectly limiting the number of people 
born at all, touching as it does on human intimacy and evolution, is a stark 
limitation of freedom.”). 
51 See generally E. A. Hammel, A Theory of Culture for Demography, 
16 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 455 (1990); see also Rath, supra note 23 (showing 
how cultural underpinnings of high fertility rates can be countervailed by 
education). 
52 See Stan Bernstein, The Changing Discourse on Population and 
Development: Toward a New Political Demography, 36 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 127 
(2005) (provides an overview of the major conferences on population, the 
concept’s evolution, and the various policies undertaken at different stages of 
global understanding of the ‘overpopulation versus reproductive rights’ balance). 
53 See, e.g., Conly, supra note 39; Chapman, supra note 45; see also 
CHRISTINE OVERALL, WHY HAVE CHILDREN: THE ETHICAL DEBATE 180-84 (MIT 
PRESS 2012) (arguing to uphold a basic right of two children per couple); see also 
Carol S. Robb, Liberties, Claims, Entitlements, and Trumps: Reproductive Rights 
and Ecological Responsibilities, 26 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 283, 294 (1998) 
(speaking of “moral disapproval of fertility above replacement rate”); see 
generally Elisabeth Cripps, Climate Change, Population, and Justice: Hard 
Choices to Avoid Tragic Choices, 8 GLOBAL JUST. 1 (2015).	  
54 See SONIA CORREA & REBECCA REICHMANN, POPULATION AND 
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES FROM THE SOUTH 66 (1994) 
(showing that “[r]eproductive rights are human rights which are inalienable and 
inseparable from basic rights such as food, shelter, health, security, livelihood, 
education, and political empowerment”). 
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father, or priest.55  As for a claim to the cultural right of having a 
large family, it was shown that high fertility in certain areas is most 
often neither an exercise of rights nor a reaction to economic needs, 
but simply an inertial perpetuation of socially transmitted, learned 
traits, which can and should be unlearned.56 
 
 With so many sensitive variables and irreconcilable views, 
it is no wonder that the debate was put on hold at the U.N., as 
detailed in the following subsection. Recent events, however, in 
addition to the aforementioned statement of Turkey, suggest that 
some stakeholders may have sensibly altered their views, thus 
providing a window of opportunity for reopening the discussion on 
OP. 
(b)   Cracks in the Spiral of Silence on Overpopulation? 
           The aversion of politicians and policy makers at the U.N. to 
approaching the population growth issue in the last two decades was 
noted by many scholars. It was shown, for example, that the United 
Nations Environmental Program (“UNEP”) deals with everything 
but population,57 and that “neglect of human population size is 
indeed widespread.”58 One author bluntly stated that “the United 
Nations . . . does not want debate.”59  Symptomatically, the 
Millennium Development Goals adopted in 2000 completely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 See Lynn P. Freedman & Stephen L. Isaacs, Human Rights and 
Reproductive Choice, 24 STUD. IN FAM. PLAN. 18, 19 (1993) (advocating a 
woman-centered approach to reproductive rights, and speaking in this context 
about “the specific situations of dependency, discrimination, and fear that women 
face” in some developing countries); see also Tomris Türmen, Reproductive 
Rights: How to Move Forward?, 4 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 31, 33 (2000). 
56 Bobbi S. Low, Alice L. Clarke & Kenneth A. Lockridge, Toward an 
Ecological Demography, 18 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 1 (1992).  
57 Paul Erlich, Demography and Policy: A View from Outside the 
Discipline, 34 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 103, 107 (2008). 
58 Alcott, supra note 36, at 116.  
59 Stan Bernstein, The Changing Discourse on Population and 
Development: Toward a New Political Demography, 36 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 127, 
129 (2005). 
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ignored the issue.60  Asking in her article titled “Why the Silence on 
Overpopulation?,” one author answers: 
 
The 1994 United Nations 
International Conference on 
Population and Development (ICPD, 
or “Cairo”) was the turning point in 
removing the population subject from 
policy discourse.  The important 
difference between ICPD and the 
previous decadal UN population 
conferences was its emphasis on 
drawing attention to the needs of 
women around the world.  In the run-
up to ICPD and following the two-
week conference in Cairo, talking 
about population became politically 
incorrect in many circles.  Drawing 
attention to any connection between 
population and the environment 
became taboo -- again, because it was 
viewed, or promoted, as 
disadvantageous to women.61  
 
           This author’s response is but one explanation.  Others may 
have to do with troubling memories from the disastrous population 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 G.A. Res. 55/2, United Nations Millennium Declaration (Sept. 
18, 2000). 
61 Martha Campbell, Why the Silence on Population? 28 POPULATION & 
ENV. 237, 241 (2007); see also Robert Engelman, Population, Climate Change 
and Women’s Lives, 183 WORLDWATCH REP. 1, 5 (2010) (showing that 
“[a]lthough many policymakers would welcome slower population growth, there 
is a concern that policies to slow growth will violate the right of couples to 
determine their own family size”).  
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss1/3
2017 Thoughts on the U.N. 2017 Population Prospects 137 
policies put in place in countries like India62 or Peru63 in the second 
half of the last century, or with the developing countries’ 
accusations of Western cultural and demographic imperialism.64  
Also, the conservative (Christian and Islamic) religious lobby is 
indicated by some authors as a main inhibitor of debate at the UN.65  
 
           But regardless of its causes, the spiral of silence built around 
OP is a fact, and it is this Article’s claim that recent developments 
should shake it.  To look first at the pretext of this paper—Erdogan’s 
statement—how should an aggressive, unacceptable statement by a 
head of state, inciting its supposed followers to multiply excessively 
in another country, contribute to breaking this spiral of silence?  The 
answer is embodied in the question: by being aggressive and 
unacceptable in light of norms of civility in international relations.  
 
In a non-academic expression: the ostrich policy may work 
when all is silent above the ground, but should come to an end if the 
ostrich is kicked in the rear. Erdogan’s statement touches upon one 
of the most sensitive issues associated with overpopulation: regional 
security threats, following internal conflict or mass migration.66 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 See generally Davidson R. Gwatkin, Political Will and Family 
Planning: The Implications of India’s Emergency Experience, 5 POPULATION 
DEV. REV. 29 (1979). 
63 See generally Anna-Britt Coe, From Anti-Natalist to Ultra-
Conservative: Restricting Reproductive Choice in Peru, 12 REPROD. HEALTH 
MATTERS 56 (2004). 
64 See, e.g., Bahati Kuumba, Population Policy in the Era of 
Globalisation: A Case of Reproductive Imperialism, 16 AGENDA: EMPOWERING 
WOMEN FOR GENDER EQUITY 22 (2001) (critiquing Western policies). 
65 See generally Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, From Population Control 
to Reproductive Rights: Feminist Fault Lines, 3 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 152, 
159 (1995) (pointing to the “unusual alliance among, the Vatican, its client states, 
and some Middle Eastern governments”); see also Brander, supra note 29, at 6 
(listing religious sensitivities as hurdles that population debates need to side-step, 
in recent times of religious radicalization). 
66 The positive correlation between population growth and the propensity 
of civil conflict was demonstrated in numerous studies. See, e.g., Markus 
Brückner, Population Size and Civil Conflict Risk: Is There a Causal Link? 120 
ECON. J. 535 (2010); Henrik Urdal, Population, Resources, and Political 
Violence, A Subnational Study of India, 1956–2002, 15 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 590 
(2008). 
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While it is morally improper to hold a failed state responsible for 
being a source of mass emigration, and it is practically difficult with 
a state that quietly promotes policies of cultural invasion, none of 
these scenarios are the case here. A positive measure aimed at 
altering the ethnic and cultural balance in another country, publicly 
announced by the head of a state with aspirations to join the 
European Union, amounts to an internationally wrongful act as 
shown above, and thus should at least prompt a serious international 
debate on the issue of overpopulation. 
 
Other recent developments also indicate that the time may 
be ripe for an honest debate on overpopulation. A recent position 
issued by the Vatican calls for couples to refrain from procreation 
unless they can bring up their children properly,67 which comes in 
stark contrast with centuries old teachings on the blessings of having 
large families. Pope Francis’s ‘unorthodox’ position is not 
accidental, but in line with previous views indicating more 
flexibility on reproductive matters in the broader framework of 
fighting poverty in the developing world.68  
 
 A look at the views expressed by the other major global 
religion in terms of number of adherents—Islam—also shows 
encouraging signs. A quick online search produced several policies 
in countries of Islamic faith, such as Pakistan, Niger, Iran, and 
Uganda, recommending a maximum of four children per family.69 
Admittedly, an average of four children per family is still almost 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Jan Bentz, Pope Has Urged Having Fewer Children if ‘You Cannot 
Bring Them Up Properly’, LIFESITE NEWS (Mar. 3, 2017, 8:30 AM), 
https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/francis-praised-by-population-controller-at-
vatican-workshop-for-urging-us. 
68 Claire E. Brolan & Peter S. Hill, Sexual and Reproductive Health and 
Rights in the Evolving Post-2015 Agenda: Perspectives from Key Players from 
Multilateral and Related Agencies in 2013, 22 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 66, 67 
(2014) (citing an interviewee from the U.N.). 
69 Law Pertaining to Population and Family Planning of 23 May 1993 
(Iran); Pakistan Population Policy (2010), MINISTRY OF POPULATION AND 
WELFARE; Déclaration de Gouvernement en Matière de Politique de Population 
(2007), Gov’t of Niger; National Population Policy for Social Transformation and 
Sustainable Development (2008), MINISTRY OF FIN., PLANNING & ECON. DEV. 
(Uganda). 
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double the replacement fertility rate,70 but the fact that Islamic 
leaders are at least willing to mention a cap is more than the new 
U.S. administration would do—see the recent cancellation of funds 
for the United Nations Population Fund (“UNFPA”) motivated by 
unsubstantiated claims that UNFPA supports forced abortions in 
China.71  In fact, even Turkey’s President exhibits acceptance of the 
idea that excessive population growth is bad as he makes a clear 
distinction between what he sees desirable at home and abroad in 
terms of family size.  While for Turks abroad he encourages a 
minimum of five children, as seen above, for home he only suggests 
three,72 which seems like an acceptable limit if we consider the 
larger context of family sizes and population planning in countries 
of the Muslim religion.  
 
We should not conclude the brief overview of recent 
developments on the religions’ views without putting them in their 
historical context.  The wider leeway for reinterpretation and change 
in Islam, compared to the Christian Church, permitted leaders like 
Iran’s Khomeini, Egypt’s Mubarak, or Tunisia’s Bourguiba to 
promote in the recent past successful population policies.73  These 
policies reduced the fertility rate under three children per woman, 
without the abuse that accompanied similar efforts in countries like 
Peru or India.74  It is perhaps exactly this lack of a monolithic 
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understanding of the Islamic rules that allowed these leaders to 
navigate smoothly in the waters of tempering population growth. 
Similarly, the rigidity of the Christian rules led to more radical, sort 
of ‘all or nothing’ approaches by policy makers in countries where 
the Christian religion intermingles with state business (to be noted, 
again, that the United States seems to have recently joined this club, 
since one of the first priorities of President Donald Trump’s 
Administration was toughening the abortion rules75). 
           The above changes in some stakeholders’ positions are 
indicated by their statements or actions but more changes can be 
detected in the international community’s silent acceptance of a 
major recent demographic event, such as China’s two-children 
policy announced in 2015.76  The previous one-child policy, 
launched in 1978, was met with ferocious criticism in the Western 
human rights discourse and led to radical measures like the U.S. 
repeatedly cancelling its contributions to United Nations Fund for 
Population Activities (“UNFPA”), based on allegations that it 
supported China’s policy.77  Now, the two-children policy is 
accepted without reaction, which is strange.  After all, a cap is 
abusive, regardless of the number.  The lack of Western reaction to 
the two-children policy must have a reason.  Either times have 
changed since 1978 and the world has come to realize that 
something must be done to curb OP, or a cap is acceptable in 
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principle, but the cap of one child was too restrictive.  Notably, the 
cap of two is also suggested by a recent change in the United 
Kingdom’s child tax credit policy.  From April of 2017, a family can 
claim child tax credit, which is worth up to £2,780 per child each 
year, only for the first two children.78  
(c)  From Global Problem to Global Risk? 
           The events noted above are obviously not of a magnitude to 
prompt a radical change in the discourse on OP, but could become 
‘pull’ (the openness of some stakeholders) and ‘push’ (the 
aggressiveness of Turkey) factors for academics and policy makers 
to re-assess the population problem.  In order to avoid the debate 
going to the same dead end as before, like the one of unclear OP 
threshold and uncertain future demographic evolutions, this Article 
proposes reconceptualising OP as global risk.  Global policy is 
generally understood to be motivated by a distinct ‘policy problem,’ 
namely “a set of circumstances that can be potentially improved 
upon with purposeful action.”79 Global policy problems:  
 
[C]an be distinguished from those 
that are merely national . . . on the 
basis of two criteria which normally 
go hand in hand. First, the problem 
has aroused concern throughout much 
of the world. Second, it has been, or 
can be expected to be, taken up by one 
or more international institutions, 
such as the United Nations.80  
 
           Concern with OP has indeed been aroused throughout much 
of the world. Even in Europe, where the intuition tells us that people 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Patrick Knox, Making Ends Meet: What are the child tax credit 
changes 2017, what benefits can I claim and who is eligible?, THE SUN (April 6, 
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should be rather concerned with under-population given the low 
fertility rates,81 a quarter of the citizens indicate population growth 
as a major global risk; significantly, the proportion is higher among 
educated interviewees.82  However, for the reasons shown above, 
the U.N. cannot be expected to take up OP as a global policy 
problem.  In fact, in recent policies, instead of striving for solutions 
to tackle the global problem of population growth, the U.N. calmly 
recommends migration as a solution for decongesting crowded 
areas, thus in fact encouraging further increase in procreation 
rates.83 
 
           Could this change if we conceptualize OP as a global risk?  
The theory of the world risk society maintains that modern societies 
are shaped by new kinds of self-generated (as opposed to the older) 
risks,84 such as high-risk modern technologies (nuclear energy and 
genetic engineering), new types of environmental and health 
problems (global warming, worldwide pandemics), new forms of 
transnational terrorism, and systemic risks of the global economy 
and finances.85  The new global risks are characterized by three 
features: delocalization, incalculableness (hypothetical risks, based 
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on science-induced not-knowing and normative dissent), and non-
compensability.86  
 
           It has been shown above that the first two features apply to 
OP. As for non-compensability, in the context of the already-
recognized new risks, it means, for example, that if the climate has 
changed irreversibly, if progress in human genetics makes 
irreversible interventions in human existence possible, if terrorist 
groups already have weapons of mass destruction, then it is too late.  
The compensation logic, that is, post-factum reaction and 
adaptation, does not apply.  But this seems to be the case with OP, 
as well.  How will humanity adapt to not having enough resources 
to feed, for example, 20 billion people, other than by violently and 
suddenly reducing numbers, or breaking borders into other states? 
What was already accepted in the field of climate change, i.e., we 
are past mitigation and we should gradually move to adaptation, will 
not apply then, at least not in a peaceful manner, but in a ‘survival 
of the fittest’ scenario. 
 
Once OP is included on the list of new global risks, an 
agreement on a maximum world population should be discussed, 
similarly to what happened in the field of carbon emissions.  This 
global total87 can be translated into a population cap per couple, 
which in the beginning could be high enough to not encounter 
significant resistance from the stakeholders traditionally favouring 
high populations (churches, corporations, and the like).  Even 
though without real demographic impact, it would gradually craft 
acceptance for the idea that there is a limit to population growth.  
From here, already-proposed technical solutions could be applied—
the tradable procreation rights scheme suggested first by the British 
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economist Kenneth Boulding,88 and refined in recent years.89  A 
global convention on overpopulation, modelled after the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCC”),90 
could detail the technicalities of a global version of this scheme, so 
that the rights left unused in the developed world can be transferred 
to other countries. 
CONCLUSION 
           This Article had as departure point relatively recent events 
relevant to the debate on the limits to population growth.  Focusing 
on statements made earlier this year by the President of Turkey, it 
discussed the impact of exaggerated fertility rates of one immigrant 
group, when they are incited by the leadership of their country of 
origin, with declared political purposes, to multiply excessively.  
Zooming out, this Article embraced more generally the situations in 
which high fertility rates lead to mass emigration.  In both cases, 
albeit more clearly in the first, the country of origin can be the 
subject of a claim of interference and breach of neighbors’ 
sovereignty.  For the second, more general case, the discussion 
remains speculative, mainly because the idea of limiting the 
population growth is a taboo matter in international policy circles, 
for subjective and objective reasons.  As a result, there is no legal 
obligation for a country to stabilize its population. Therefore, even 
if in a particular case mass immigration in one country can be 
attributed to overpopulation in another country, a claim against the 
latter would be unsuccessful.  
 
           This Article, however, spotted recent evolutions that suggest 
a more flexible attitude of stakeholders in the population debate: 
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representatives of major religions and the Western human rights 
lobby.  Taken together with the bellicose position of Turkey’s 
president, these suggest a window of opportunity for global policy 
makers who are preoccupied by overpopulation.  Turkey’s 
aggressive stance could be a ‘push’ factor for a renewed debate, 
while the other elements could be ‘pull’ factors, in the sense that 
they are somehow inviting discussion and analysis, perhaps with 
new arguments.  
 
           With respect to these new arguments, this paper suggested 
that to avoid the dead end in which the overpopulation debate was 
abandoned some two decades ago, global policy makers could re-
conceptualize OP as global risk, which would justify a preventative 
approach.  If OP is found to present the traits of a global risk, then 
countries with excessive fertility rates could be persuaded to assume 
population stabilization, in its non-coercive variant and perhaps in 
cooperation with the international community, as an internationally- 
binding obligation. 
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